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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLEO R, POWELL,

*

Appellant,
vs.
DICK Et BASTIAN; DEE
V, SHARP, dba SHARP
REALTY and PROVO
BRANCH PRUDENTIAL
FEDERAL SAVINGS and
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a
Federally Chartered
Savings and Loan
Association,
Respondents.

*
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13939

*
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT .
Dee V. Sharp
Nature of the Case
This is an action for damages
in connection with the sale of a house by
the appellant to the defendant Bastian
with an option to repurchase.

It is basi-

cally a dispute as to the disposition of
the proceeds of the second sale of the
same house to a third party named
Ethington.

This respondent was involved
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only in a correlary issue as to whether
the appellant was liable for fees to the
realtor who located the second purchasor.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
• » '

•

.

.

.

.

. . .

- IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried in the
District Court without a jury, and on the
issue involving this Respondent, the Court
found that there was a fiduciary relationship between the realtor and the Seller of
the property, but that that relationship
did not require the realtor to adjudicate
a dispute between the appellant and the
respondent Bastian, who was the first purchasor of the house.
'• FACTS OF THE CASE
In June of 1970, the Appellant
owned a home in Orem, Utah, which was encumbered by a first mortgage at Walker
Bank and Trust Company, a second mortgage
at Lockhart Company, in addition to which
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the^e was a judgment in favor of Provo
Adjustment Service and a warrant for delinquent taxes in favor of the State Tax
Commission,
The holder of the second
mortgage threatened to foreclose because
of delinquent installments owned by the
appellant, and in order to avoid this
calamity, the Plaintiff approached the
Respondent Bastian and ultimately sold him
the property for the $16,000,00. taking
back an option to repurchase within three
months for $18,000.00, plus interest.

She

deeded the property to Bastian who paid
off the second mortgage and assumed the
first mortgage;

Bastian also paid off the

judgment and the tax lien and paid to
Appellant the balance of $3,055,34,
After attempting unsuccessfully to sell the home privately, the
appellant listed the property for sale
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with Boley Realty Company who registered
it on the Multiple Listing Service in Utah
County.

j
Respondent Sharp, a broker who

is also connected with the Multiple Listing
Service, located a buyer named Ethington
and he prepared on behalf of the Ethingtons
an earnest money offer which he presented to
Mrs, Powell,

After accepting the offer and

signing the earnest money agreement, Mrs.
Powell informed Sharp that she had sold the
property to Bastian and that Sharp would
have to obtain Bastian1s signature on the
earnest money; she did not disclose the fact
that she had an option to repurchase the
property,
Mr. Sharp arranged for
Ethingtons to finance the purchase of their
new home through Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan and attended the loan closing with
his clients, the Ethingtons.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr, Sharp approved the closing
statements insofar as they applied to

the

Ethingtons, he was not aware of any dispute
between Mrs, Powell and Mr. Bastian until
some months later when Mrs. Powell took out
bankruptcy and Sharp received a series of
letters from an attorney actiingon behalf
of Mrs. Powell.
Exhibits

(See Stewart-Sharp letters,

f, M

A , M B ? \ and n C M .)
The appellant's argument

Points I, II, IV, V and VI, are addressed
to the other respondents and no

attempt

will be made hereto respond to those points.
The respondent Sharp will respond only to
Point III of the appellant's brief.

POINT I
A REAL ESTATE BROKER IS
ONLY REQUIRED TO ACT IN
GOOD FAITH AND NOT AS A
GUARANTOR.
The appellant in her brief
relies almost wholely on the case of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Reese ygV Harper, 8 Utah 2Cd) 119, 329 P,
2(d) 410, in attempting to argue that the
broker somehow violated his fiduciary duty
to the appellant,

On page 15 of the Appel-

lants brief, it is stated;
"Mrs. Powell alleged in her
verified complaint and the
trial court found as fact
(R-104) that defendant Sharp
was employed by Mrs. Powell
as her agent and the court
found Sharp owed her a fidciary duty. This finding
places this aspect to this
case on all fours with Reese
vs.. Harper..,"
The actual finding of the Court
was distinctly to the contrary.

The Court's

memorandum decision, Judge Bullock found
in paragraph 2\
"2, Defendant Dee V. Sharp
as a real estate broker,
had a duty to the seller
to whom he charged a commission to apply his abili^
ties and knowledge to the
advantage of the seller
and make full disclosure
to the seller, etc. as set
forth in Reese vs. Harper,
8 Utah 2(d) 119; nothwithstanding the fact that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sale? agency contract was
with another real estate
agent, However, this obligation pertains to the
interests of the seller,
as opposed to the interests
of the buyer and except
as to good faith requirements, it does not require
the agent who has found a
buyer for the property
to represent one seller
as against another seller,
especially where there
is nothing, as in this
case, to put him on notice,
that there is any conflict
of interest between them.
There is no evidence that
Dee V. Sharp acted without entire good faith.'1
The case before the Court is
easily distinguishable from the Reese vs.
Harper case.

In Reese vs. Harper, the

broker had, in fact, listed the Seller's
property for the sum of $45,000.00, he
then located a buyer who offered to pay
$30,000.00 for the property,

There were

outstanding mortgages and other obligations
against the property amounting to approximately $15,000.00 and the seller of the
property assumed that the new buyer was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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assuming the obligations outstanding
against the property and that they would
net $30,000,00.

In fact they would net

only approximately half that much because
the sale to the purchasor did not include
an assumption of the outstanding obligations,
but anticipated the payment of all outstanding obligations out of the purchase
price of $30,000.00. The court quite

.

rightly held in the Reese vs. Harper case
that the broker had failed to disclose the
true facts to his client and therefore forfeited any right he had to recover his
broker1s fees.
In the instant case the
opposite is true, it is Mrs. Powell, who
failed to disclose all of the facts known
by her to the realtor,

She alone knew the

full facts of the transaction between her
and Mr, Bastian and at no time did she
ever disclose those facts to Mr, Sharp.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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She simply told him thatt the property had
been sold and in order for the second sale
to take place to the Ethingtons, Mr. Sharp
would have to get the earnest money assignment signed by Bastian.

In actual practice

it is not at all unusual for the owner of
the fee to sell on an unrecorded contract
under which another person is the equitable
owner,
On page 16 of appellant's
brief, appellant referrs to three separate
grounds for her contention that Mr. Sharp
failed to perform his duties, to-wit:
(a).

by failing to notify her of the time

and place of the closing,

(b). by failure

to examine and approve the closing statement and (c) by permitting unlawful
charges against Mrs. Powellls equity.
The trial court found on the
facts, that Mrs. Powell had not disclosed
to Mr. Sharp any reason to be concerned
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on her behalf? he had simply located a
buyer ready and willing and able to purv
chase the property and he assumed that
according to custom that Prudential Federal Savings and Loan, the loaning institution would conduct the closing meeting to
be held in their offices and that his only
responability would be to see that the
accounts balanced as between E thing tons and
the seller or sellers.
The trial court correctly
found that it is beyond the scope of Reese
vs, Harper to require the Realtor to act
as a mediator between two sellers. The
court also correctly found:
ff

there is not evidence that
defendant Sharp acted without entire good faith.-1
In the case of Bunnell vs.
Bills, 13 Utah 2(d) 83, 368 P. 2(d)
599, at page 600, our court distinquished
between that case and the Reese vs. Harper
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case on the grounds that in the Bunnell '
case that was doubt as to the validity of
the contention that the realtor was acting
as the Plaintiff*s agent, when in fact he
was agent for the other party.

There can

be no doubt that there is a different
fiduciary duty and a more demanding one in
a situation like Reese vs. Harper, than in
the instant case, there was full disclosure
of all the information that the realtor had
to the seller.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT FOUND ON
THE FACTS THAT UNDER THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, MR. SHARP
HAD DISCHARGED HIS DUTY
TO MRS. POWELL ffWITH
REASONABLE DILIGENCE,"
The Reese vs, Harper case
also been referred to by our Supreme Court
in the case of Raspbury vs. Bainum, 15 Utah
2(d) 62, 387 P, 2(d) 240, the court in
resta ting the Reese vs. Harper, doctrine
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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refers to duty flowing from the fact that
one party is in a pecular position to be
familar with the fiduciary affairs of the
other.

It is evident from the record that

no such relationship existed between Mrs.
Powell and Mr. Sharp. Mr. Sharp was in
fact, a representive of the Ethingtons,
who were the ultimate purchasers of the
property.

He simply presented an earnest

money offer to Mrs. Powell, who told him
in terms he reasonably interpreted as
disclaiming any further financial interest
in the contract, that she had sold the
property to Mr, Bastian and Mr. Sharp would
have to look to the Bastians for a further
signature, in order to effectuate the sale
of the property to the Ethingtons, No
communication was made to Mr, Sharp that
would in any way place him on notice that
there was a dispute between Powell and
Bastian,
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It is likewise it not unusual
for a prior owner such as Mrs, Powell to
still have a financial interest in the
property when it is resold, so the fact
that Bastian was shown as seller and that
Mrs, Powell had a distribution from the
closing would impose no

duty on Mr. Sharp

to protect her rights, when no such rights
were made known to him.
The appellant herein has
elected not to rely on the trial transcript.
In effect, this is then an appeal on the
law only and the facts as found by the
lower court should be accepted on appeal
in the light most favorable to the Res*pondent,
The lower court found Mr.
Sharp to have performed his function in
good faith, if Mrs. Powell has any complaint, it is that Bastian owes her some
money.

If that is true, then she has a
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 14
full and complete remedy available at
law and no stringent equitable remedy is
applicable,
Respectfully submitted this
9th day of May, 1975.

J,2£L
ELLIS/y&ttorney
or Respondent-Sharp

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Mailing Certificate
Mailed a copy of the fore^
going Brief of Respondent to, Justin C,
Stewartf Attorney for appellant, at 425
Newhouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
84111, and Dallas H, Young, Jr., attorney
for Bastian, 48 North University, Provo,
Utah, and S, Rex Lewis, attorney for
Respondent-Prudential Federal Savings and
Loan Association, 120 East 300 North, Provo,
Utah, postage prepaid this 8th

day of

May, 1975, at Provo, Utah.
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